Lightning & Corsair

[Netpackrat]

Each plane also had characteristics that gave it particular strengths and weaknesses. A plane employed in a way that made use of its strengths was much more effective than that same plane used in a way that emphasized its weaknesses.

The classic example for that being the P-40. It was more or less a dog in US service in both theaters. In the hands of the AVG, using tactics that maximized its strengths, it was far more effective. Or the P-39. In US service, it was quickly relegated to stateside training duty, but the Russians made good use of it in ground attack.

[Greg]

Each plane also had characteristics that gave it particular strengths and weaknesses. A plane employed in a way that made use of its strengths was much more effective than that same plane used in a way that emphasized its weaknesses.

The classic example for that being the P-40. It was more or less a dog in US service in both theaters. In the hands of the AVG, using tactics that maximized its strengths, it was far more effective. Or the P-39. In US service, it was quickly relegated to stateside training duty, but the Russians made good use of it in ground attack.

I had to look it up, I remembered the plane but couldn't remember the name, and 'that plane' isn't very descriptive.

Or the Brewster Buffalo. For some reason the Finns did well with it, but for everyone else it was a death trap.

[Netpackrat]

Or the Brewster Buffalo. For some reason the Finns did well with it, but for everyone else it was a death trap.

Apparently not exactly Buffaloes. And they were going up against Russians.

[Mike OTDP]

Or the Brewster Buffalo. For some reason the Finns did well with it, but for everyone else it was a death trap.

Engine cooling. The engines would overheat in the tropics. Worked fine in Finland.

[Aegis]

While it's not as sleek, I've always preferred the looks of the Hellcat to the Corsair (and really, to pretty much all the other WWII fighters). Not that I'd turn a Corsair down as a gift, mind you.

[Aesop]

You can't just look at air to air... The Allied fighters also did a lot of ground attack, and a fighter like the P-51, with its single, liquid cooled engine, and belly mounted radiator, was decidedly inferior for that work. A single hit to the cooling system could bring it down. Maybe not immediately, but it was a long flight back to base.

Right, it's just that A/A is what's relevant to whether or not an enemy pilot would find them "easy prey." If you ask Adolf Galland, he'd say the P-38 was exactly that. Other German aces said things more along the lines of having to learn a series of very hard lessons to figure out how to counter the P-38, and it was never easy. FWIW, anything Adolf Galland said should be taken with a grain of salt. He was a fighter pilot's fighter pilot, with all the charming personality quirks that implies.

All true, and with the further proviso that Galland ascribes to aircraft faults most properly to be noted as pilot failures, not airframe failures.
We (both the US and the UK) put a lot of green kids up with 100 hours - theirs were sergeants, in many cases - and against someone like Galland with a decade of pre-war flying experience - from gliders to multi-engine transports - who had already knocked down 100 planes before the US even entered the war. The punishment curve of inexperience is a harsh schoolmaster in combat.
Dolph also neglects to observe that he was shot down four times himself by Brits in those 2 1/2 years, which for a German over Europe meant a walk back to the aerodrome, but for a Western pilot usually meant a short cold death in the Channel or a long train ride to a KZ until fairly late in the war. He further never faced US planes flown by US pilots for the bulk of the war, being forbidden by orders to fly combat from early 1942 until March 1945, when he did return to combat in jets, exclusively, for the last 30-60 days of active combat. (During which, flying a jet vs. piston engine planes, he whacked about 1 day, which is marvelous for him, but not particularly surprising.)
So his comments are rather less than first-hand observations from an equal based on combat experience in similar aircraft. Either he disobeyed orders, or he was merely repeating ready-room gouge from his colleagues with notably shorter careers against those "easy kill" airplanes.
If one wishes to know about early-war dogfights in the Battle of Britain, Galland is the go-to guy.
But for info re: the Russian front, or nearly anything to do with vs. US planes for most of the war, he'd mainly be talking out his other end.
Whoops.

[Netpackrat]

He disobeyed orders a lot and flew combat missions during the period when he was General der Jagdflieger. He was known to have flown an FW-190D (which did not appear until late '43) that was upgraded with additional armor.

[Vonz90]

We largely withdrew the P38 from front line operations in Europe as the war pushed on. That should really tell you all you need to know about how effective we thought it was.

If you want to hear from the other side, Günther Rall said much the same thing and he not only fought against them he flew capturd P38 and P51's.

And just to close out the argument, here is what a P38 commander thought about the things :
For context, we present a previously unpublished letter from the Commanding Officer of the 20th Fighter Group, to the 8th Air Force Headquarters. The letter spells out the problems faced by the P-38 Groups in clear, unambiguous terms.


20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)

3 June 1944

Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.

To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.

1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any way to "low rate" our present equipment.

2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status.

3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.

4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.

5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.

6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat.

7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane.

8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.

9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.

HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

[Greg]

I've read in a number of places that the P-38 was relatively difficult and expensive to manufacture, excessively complicated and thus also difficult to maintain and to train pilots to operate.

Whereas the P-51 was cheaper to build, easier to maintain and fly, requiring less pilot training.

Logistically, I know which one is a winner. The larger the scale of the conflict, the more things like that matter.

[BDK]

I would twin engine v single would have, by definition, made it more complicated and expensive.