Random Thoughts on WWII and replacement policy in the ETO
Posted: Tue Jun 19, 2018 3:10 pm
So I'm re-reading Ambrose's Citizen Soldiers, and I came to the section where he writes about the horrific mess that was the replacement system in the ETO. Ambrose writes about how the U.S. Army fed individual replacements into combat divisions still on the front line, rather than pulling battle-worn divisions out of the line to refit and absorb replacements.
What Ambrose doesn't discuss is the biggest reason why Eisenhower didn't pull those divisions out of the line – because he didn't have enough divisions to allow it. Ike couldn't pull divisions out of the line without spreading the remaining divisions too thinly.
This got me to thinking – the official strategy of the United States and our British allies was Germany First. This strategy was first outlined in Admiral Stark's Plan Dog memo, and then confirmed by the ABC conferences and in the Rainbow 5 plans. The Germany First strategy called for remaining on the strategic defensive in the Pacific until Germany was defeated.
But the United States didn't follow that plan. Instead, the Americans started on the strategic offensive in late 1943. The twin offensives began with MacArthur's Huon Peninsula campaign in September and Nimitz's landings at Tarawa in November and met in the Philippines in October of 1944. (Note that late summer and fall of 1944 was also when Eisenhower's armies were pushing up against the Seigfried Line on the German border.)
Eisenhower had 49 U.S. Army divisions in northwest Europe. 21 U.S. Army divisions fought in the Pacific, plus 6 divisions of Marines. (This count does not include the Philippine Division, which effectively fell of the order of battle in the spring of 1942.) In fact, as Russell Weigley pointed out, until early 1944, the U.S. actually had more men deployed to the Pacific theater than Europe, including Italy and the Mediterranean. Had the U.S. remained on the strategic defensive, many of those divisions, maybe as many as two thirds of the Army divisions, could have been employed in Europe.
(As an aside, the term 'strategic defensive' does not necessarily preclude any and all offensive action. Indeed, some offensive actions – namely, the seizure of Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomons campaign under Operation Cartwheel, as well as the early stages of MacArthur's New Guinea campaign would probably have been necessary as part of the strategic defense, in order to secure the SLOCs to Australia, and establish a defensible perimeter for the Land Down Under. So the strategic defensive still probably would have required 10 divisions or so, for those limited offensive operations, plus the defense of Alaska, Midway, Hawaii, and Panama.)
A true strategic defensive in the Pacific might have allowed from 10 to 13 more infantry divisions to be shipped to Europe. (I'm just SWAGging the numbers; I haven't done any serious troop-to-task analysis.) Those numbers might well have allowed the U.S. Army in northwest Europe to pull divisions off the front line for rest and refit, and allowed replacements to be sent to units that way.
But political considerations – i.e. the fact that the Japanese had started the war, and the United States couldn't, for domestic political reasons, just allow them to hang out in the Pacific largely unmolested. The political need for the strategic offensive in the Pacific would have become even more pronounced as the U.S. Navy built it strength in 1943 and 1944 to the point where it could sail almost unchallenged throughout most of the central Pacific
And thus the Army in northwest Europe got put in the unfortunate position, at least with regards to replacements, that it did.
What Ambrose doesn't discuss is the biggest reason why Eisenhower didn't pull those divisions out of the line – because he didn't have enough divisions to allow it. Ike couldn't pull divisions out of the line without spreading the remaining divisions too thinly.
This got me to thinking – the official strategy of the United States and our British allies was Germany First. This strategy was first outlined in Admiral Stark's Plan Dog memo, and then confirmed by the ABC conferences and in the Rainbow 5 plans. The Germany First strategy called for remaining on the strategic defensive in the Pacific until Germany was defeated.
But the United States didn't follow that plan. Instead, the Americans started on the strategic offensive in late 1943. The twin offensives began with MacArthur's Huon Peninsula campaign in September and Nimitz's landings at Tarawa in November and met in the Philippines in October of 1944. (Note that late summer and fall of 1944 was also when Eisenhower's armies were pushing up against the Seigfried Line on the German border.)
Eisenhower had 49 U.S. Army divisions in northwest Europe. 21 U.S. Army divisions fought in the Pacific, plus 6 divisions of Marines. (This count does not include the Philippine Division, which effectively fell of the order of battle in the spring of 1942.) In fact, as Russell Weigley pointed out, until early 1944, the U.S. actually had more men deployed to the Pacific theater than Europe, including Italy and the Mediterranean. Had the U.S. remained on the strategic defensive, many of those divisions, maybe as many as two thirds of the Army divisions, could have been employed in Europe.
(As an aside, the term 'strategic defensive' does not necessarily preclude any and all offensive action. Indeed, some offensive actions – namely, the seizure of Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomons campaign under Operation Cartwheel, as well as the early stages of MacArthur's New Guinea campaign would probably have been necessary as part of the strategic defense, in order to secure the SLOCs to Australia, and establish a defensible perimeter for the Land Down Under. So the strategic defensive still probably would have required 10 divisions or so, for those limited offensive operations, plus the defense of Alaska, Midway, Hawaii, and Panama.)
A true strategic defensive in the Pacific might have allowed from 10 to 13 more infantry divisions to be shipped to Europe. (I'm just SWAGging the numbers; I haven't done any serious troop-to-task analysis.) Those numbers might well have allowed the U.S. Army in northwest Europe to pull divisions off the front line for rest and refit, and allowed replacements to be sent to units that way.
But political considerations – i.e. the fact that the Japanese had started the war, and the United States couldn't, for domestic political reasons, just allow them to hang out in the Pacific largely unmolested. The political need for the strategic offensive in the Pacific would have become even more pronounced as the U.S. Navy built it strength in 1943 and 1944 to the point where it could sail almost unchallenged throughout most of the central Pacific
And thus the Army in northwest Europe got put in the unfortunate position, at least with regards to replacements, that it did.